International politics today looks increasingly like a bonfire of agreements, norms and rules. The US — the anchor of the world order — is assaulting the global trading system, and has withdrawn from international agreements on climate change and Iran. China, the rising power, is building military bases across the South China Sea — in defiance of rulings by an international tribunal, and the wishes of its neighbours. Russia has annexed Crimea, part of a neighbouring country.
Both America and China are increasingly tempted to break free of the constraints of international agreements and to use their power to achieve their goals, unilaterally. Russia lacks the economic might of a great power. But it has the territorial expanse and the nuclear arsenal, and has made a mighty contribution to an atmosphere of growing international lawlessness.
All of this creates a dilemma for the world’s middle powers. Germany, France, Japan and Britain cannot flex their muscles like great powers. But they are international players, with global economic and security interests. They need a world with rules.
This common problem also creates an opportunity. It is time for an informal alliance of middle-sized powers that are interested in supporting a global rules-based order. Individually, these nations cannot ensure the survival of the World Trade Organization, or sustain international human-rights law or global environmental standards. But, collectively, they have a chance of working together to preserve a world based around rules and rights, rather than power and force.
It would be efficient to start small. A six-nation group — in descending order of population size — could include Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Canada and Australia. They are all rich democracies, which means they are likely to have similar interests and values. They are all big trading nations. They all have real military capacity and (with the exception of Japan) a willingness to deploy forces overseas. And they share an interest in international rules that go beyond trade and investment, but also encompass the defence of international human rights standards.
There are clearly other possible members of such a middle-power alliance, such as South Korea, South Africa, Italy and Brazil. But the South Africans and Brazilians are already members of the Brics grouping, which is angled towards emerging markets. Italy may be tilting towards Trump-style nationalism and protectionism. And South Korea has a huge and preoccupying issue on its doorstep.
What could the middle powers actually do, other than give each other consoling hugs? They should start by noting the similarity of their positions and concerns. For decades, the six middle powers have organised their international positions around two pillars: a strong relationship with the US and membership of a powerful regional grouping, such as the EU, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation or the North American Free Trade Agreement.
The Donald Trump era has upended their assumptions. Whatever the Europeans, Australians, Japanese and Canadians say publicly, they are all dismayed by the current direction of the US. The protectionism of the Trump administration is a direct threat to their economic interests. (The US is likely to press ahead with steel tariffs on the EU on June 1.) The US’s current unpredictability and incipient isolationism also poses questions about the robustness of its security guarantees to its allies.
With US leadership increasingly erratic, the middle powers should do more to co-ordinate their positions and lobby on the big global issues: trade, climate change, arms control and peace efforts in the Middle East and Asia. Depending on what happens in America, this co-ordination could either be seen as preserving the current international order until the US reverts to normal, or, more gloomily, the start of a process of building alternative structures to defend liberal values.
Some in Europe and Asia have begun to speculate about enlisting Chinese or Russian support to protect middle-power interests. But that is not a promising avenue. Vladimir Putin’s willingness to use force and subversion — and to lie about it — rules out Russia as a reliable partner. China, under Xi Jinping, has taken positions on climate and trade that are closer to the middle-power consensus. But China is a one-party state that is increasingly promoting its authoritarian values overseas.
The role of the EU in organising middle powers is potentially important, but also ambiguous. France and Germany see the EU as a possible superpower in the making — one that could stand toe-to-toe with China and the US. Yet the emergence of soft-authoritarian or populist governments within the bloc — in Hungary, Poland and maybe Italy — will make it increasingly difficult for the bloc to forge effective common positions on political questions.
However, the EU does act as a unit on trade. That makes it a powerful possible counterweight to the Trump administration’s protectionism. In the past year, Canada and Japan have signed trade deals with the EU and, last week, Australia and New Zealand opened negotiations to do the same. If and when Britain completes Brexit, it, too, will negotiate a free-trade deal with the EU. A global middle-power alliance sounds strange — and will be difficult to forge. But new times call for new thinking.
